secure disposal

As with the secure retention of information, there is no bright line that separates "secure" from "insecure" forms of disposal. For each storage medium there are more and less secure methods.

What is appropriate in a particular situation depends on the sensitivity of the information at issue, and the perceived threats to it. The more secure methods generally cost more to implement, both in time and explicit expense, so there is a trade-off. (A table of the methods, by type of storage medium, is provided here.)

In the end, only total physical destruction affords total security. For its most secret information, the US government requires that one "[d]isintegrate, incinerate, pulverize, shred, or smelt." (US DoD standard 5220.22-M) That is not always a practical option, especially if one aims to recycle or resell.

Consider the old world first: paper remains a storage medium in legacy records systems. And ever-cheaper computer printers and photocopiers make "getting it on paper" common even in facilities with fully-electronic records systems.

Paper containing sensitive information should be shredded. Strip cut shredders (also called straight cut or spaghetti cut) render paper into thin, long strips. Cross-cut shredders (also called confetti cut) provide both length-wise and width-wise dismemberment -- generating from a few to many hundreds of pieces per shredded page. (Cross-cut units make re-assembly much more difficult, but are, unfortunately, slower than strip-cutters, more expensive, and require more maintenance.)

For additional security, paper records can be pulverized (rendered into a powder by grinding), macerated (rendered into pulp by chemicals) or incinerated (burned).

It is a policy decision as to which method is sufficient, as well as whether the destruction should be done in "distributed" fashion (e.g., by small shredders located near each person's desk), or at a central location. Obviously, paper awaiting removal to such a central location can be vulnerable until it makes that trip.

Now, the new world. Electronic storage for computer devices is provided by an ever-broadening range of media; the appropriate "cleansing" method depends on the type. The main division is between "magnetic media" and "optical media."

Removable magnetic "disks" (floppies, ZIP disks, and the like) and magnetic tapes (reels, cartridges) can be "degaussed" by an appropriately-sized and -powered degausser. (Such machines derive their name from Carl Friedrich Gauss, the German mathemetician, astronomer and scientist who made major contributions to the fields of electromagnetism and geomagnetism among many others.)

Such units come in a range of degaussing power and throughput capacities (how long it takes for each operation). "High coercivity" magnetic media require more powerful degaussers to achieve cleansing effects. (Coercivity is measured in "oersteds," after the Danish physicist who discovered that a current through a wire could deflect a magnetized needle. The phenomenon inspired the development of electromagnetic theory.)

As with disposal of paper information, there are trade-offs rather than absolute standards for "erasing" magnetic media. The more powerful and lengthy the degaussing process applied to any given type of storage media, the less likely is subsequent recovery by others.

"Fixed" internal magnetic storage (such as computer hard drives), as well as removables, can be cleansed instead by a re-writing process. Software is used to over-write all the usable storage locations of a medium. The simplest method is a single over-write; additional security is provided by multiple over-writes with variations of all 0s, all 1s, complements (opposite of recorded character), and/or random characters.

Most "secure file deletion" software offers a choice of more and less secure over-writing. More secure methods take more time, given the multiple over-write operations, so again there is a tradeoff. (Note also that the quality of the over-write algorithms offered by alternative products varies. Even an organization that allows "distributed" processing of magnetic media in this fashion may wish to endorse only a limited set of products.)

An increasingly diverse range of removable "solid state" storage devices is also now available. These "flash memory" devices are solid state in that they have no moving parts (unlike a floppy disk's rotating surface), are reasonably fast (in the same speed ballpark as a hard disk) and are non-volatile (the memory maintains data even after all power sources have been disconnected).

Examples today include CompactFlash, Memory Stick, Secure Digital, SmartMedia and other types of plug-ins, and a range of "mini-" and "micro-drive" devices that use USB or FireWire ports. Secure over-writes (following manufacturer specifications) are possible for these media as well.

Neither degaussing nor over-writing offers absolute guarantees. Some theorize that with appropriate time and hardware (e.g., an electron microscope), anything can be recovered. Unless, of course, one is willing to "[d]isintegrate, incinerate, pulverize, shred, or smelt." As with paper, the method of disposal depends on the perceived risks of discovery, and estimates of the types of threat (e.g., 8th-graders with too much free time, or operatives of a foreign government).

A few kinds of "write-many" optical media (such as CD-RWs and DVD-RWs) can be processed via an over-write method. This is not the case for the vast majority of "write-once" optical media in use (notably the ubiquitous CD-R). Because such media are optical rather than magnetic, neither can they be degaussed. For the write-once variety, only physical destruction will do. (Higher-capacity paper shredders are rated for CD/DVD destruction for exactly this reason.)

Unfortunately, given the range of media and the range of cleaning methods, choices about appropriateness probably cannot be left to the common-sense determinations of each person. Organizations should have specific policies -- one important component of which will be the degree to which "do it yourself" methods are permitted, rather than central administration of cleansing functions.

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   © 2002-2006 Contributing authors and University of Miami School of Medicine